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Abstract
The Self-Repairing Flight Control System (SRFCS) Pro-
gram is sponsored by the USAF and flight-tested at the
NASA Ames Research Center, Dryden Hight Research
Facility. The program objective is the proof-of-concept
demonstration of the SRFCS using the NASA F-15 Highly
Integrated Digital Electronic Control (HIDEC) Hight Re-
search Facility. The program approach exploits the inher-
ent control redundancies of advanced aircraft by fully uti-
lizing its multiple control effectors and optimally integrat-
ing their secondary aerodynamic characteristics. This is ac-
complished by way of reconfiguration after control effector
failures. This allows the aerodynamic forces and moments
produced by the other control effectors to become the redun-
dant elements instead of massive redundant hardware. The
necessary forces and moments are generated by the integra-
tion of alternate control surfaces to provide the required air-
craft motion. This paper describes the F-15 HIDEC aircraft
and the unique features used during the SRFCS flight test
program. The development leading to the current SRFCS
configuration will be highlighted. The presentation includes
preliminary flight test results that address the operation of
the overall system, as well as the individual technologies.
The NASA F-15 flight test was the first demonstration
of real-time reconfiguration and diagnostics on a high-
performance fighter.
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Introduction
System failure or aircraft damage causing loss of con-
trol capability can compromise mission objectives and even
result in loss of aircraft. The self-repairing flight control
system (SRFCS) flight development program directly ad-
dresses this issue with a system design that can detect flight
control system failures or measure damage. The SRFCS
can immediately reconfigure the control system command
to control the aircraft and even preserve mission potential.
Furthermore, the system diagnostics process can detect in
flight the type of faults that are difficult to isolate post-
flight, which can save excessive ground maintenance time
and cost. The SRFCS diagnostics feature enhances aircraft
alert readiness by reducing ground servicing time.
The control systems of today's fighter aircraft have the
control power and surface displacement to maneuver the
aircraft in a very large flight envelope, with surplus force
capacity available from each control surface. Digital flight
control processors are designed to include the built-in status
of the control system components, as well as sensor informa-
tion on aircraft control maneuver commands and response.
In the event of failure or loss of a control surface, the SRFCS
utilizes this capability to reconfigure control commands to
the remaining control surfaces, and thus preserve the ma-
neuvering response. This reconfiguration system permits
the damaged aircraft to continue the mission safely or re-
turn to base. Damage detection must be fast and accurate,
and reconfiguration must restore sufficient flight response.
Correct postflight repair is the key to low maintainability
support costs and high aircraft mission readiness. The SR-
FCS utilizes the large database available with digital flight
control systems to diagnose faults. Built-in test and sensor
data are used as inputs to an onboard expert system (OES)
process to accurately identify failed components for post-
flight maintenance action. This diagnostic technique has the
advantage of functioning during flight. It is especially useful
in identifying intermittent faults that are present only dur-
ing maneuver g loads or high hydraulic flow requirements.
These faults are difficult to isolate in current postflight main-
tenance, resulting in cannot duplicate (CND) inconclusive
ground checks and excessive support man-hours.
A number of SRFCS feasibility studies ]-5 have devel-
oped and evaluated potential SRFCS method studies. Based
on these studies, the USAF Wright Research and Develop-
meat Center sponsored the SRFCS development and flight
test program. The NASA Ames Research Center, Dryden
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Flight Research Facility worked with the contractor, Mc-
Donnell Aircraft Company and subcontractor, General Elec-
tric Controls Division. Together they developed the flight
system to test the reconfiguration and onboard maintenance
diagnostics concepts on the NASA F-15 highly integrated
digital electronic control (HIDEC) fighter aircraft.
Key objectives of the program were:
1,
.
o
To flight-evaluate a control reconfigurafion strategy
with three types of control surface failure.
To evaluate a cockpit display that will inform the pilot
of the maneuvering capacity of the damaged aircraft.
To flight-evaluate the OES maintenance diagnostics
process using representative faults set to occur only un-
der maneuvering conditions.
The objective of the flight test program was to transi-
tion real-time reconfiguration and expert maintenance di-
agnostics technology to the operational community. Flight
demonstration is important in validating and evaluating
technology for future aircraft. Flight test exposes concepts
to the real-world environment, forcing potential problems
to be addressed. It also provides indisputable evidence of
a concept's validity. In addition, flight evaluation improves
the chances of getting a system into production.
Flight Research Aircraft With Self-Repairing
Flight Control System
The F-15 HIDEC Flight Research Facility is an ideal can-
didate for initial evaluation of this technology. A discussion
of its unique features follows.
Figure 1 shows theF-15 aircraft flown in the SRFCS flight
development program. The aircraft is equipped with a dual-
channel digital flight control system and a Hawk/32-bit pro-
cessor (Rolm Corporation, Santa Clara, California) having a
high throughput and memory capacity. Full-authority elec-
Ironic control of the ailerons was added to the test aircraft
through a series servo controller, shown in Fig. 2. Pilot stick
commands to the aileron are transmitted by mechanical link-
age; the SRFCS reconfiguration commands are added to the
aileron through the series servo.
The SRFCS utilized the high-capacity Hawk/32 proces-
sor for the major reconfigura_on subroutines, the cockpit
selection of test modes, the expert system diagnostics, dis-
play generation, and flight test data acquisition. Additional
flight control computer software included impairment con-
trol of the right stabilator, addition of the SRFCS correction
commands, and signals used for the expert system diagnos-
tics. A summary of the software requirements to implement
SRFCS is shown in Fig. 3.
In addition, the test aircraft required changes to the cen-
tral computer to link the cockpit navigation control indicator
(NCI) control panel and displays to the Hawk/32 processor
and the digital flight control computer (DFCC). The pilot
,/
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can use the addressing feature of the NCI panel to select the
various failure impairments and SRFCS test modes. Figure
4 illustrates the aircraft systems integration for implement-
ing SRFCS.
The NASA F-15 HIDEC contains full instrumentation
and data recording with real-time telemetry of key parame-
ters and pilot displays. The Hawk/32 processor also has a
data recording system, used for the OES maintenance diag-
nostics system.
Technical Overview
The F-15 HIDEC SRFCS program has developed,
implemented, and flight-tested a SRFCS. This pro-
gram includes control reconfiguration, a head-up display
(HUD) positive pilot alert system, and knowledge-based
maintenance diagnostics.
The SRFCS program approach exploits the inherent con-
trol redundancies of advanced aircraft by fully utilizing its
multiple control effectors and their secondary aerodynamic
characteristics. This is accomplished by reconfiguration, af-
ter control effector failures, to allow control substitution by
the remaining effectors. Instead of using massive redundant
hardware on each effector to achieve fault tolerance and re-
liability, the redundant elements become the aerodynamic
forces and moments produced by the other control effec-
tors. The necessary forces and moments are generated by
the alternate control surfaces to provide the required aircraft
motion.
In today's fighter and transport-commercial aircraft, the
control systems have the power and surface displacement to
maneuver the aircraft in a very large flight envelope, with
surplus force capacity available from each control surface.
In the event of failure or loss of a control surface, the SRFCS
utilizes this capability to reconfigure control commands to
the remaining control surfaces, and thus preserve the ma-
neuvering response.
Reconfiguration is one of the few technologies that holds
promise to meet the availability and survivability require-
ments for aircraft in a hostile environment, while minimiz-
ing the complexity and costs of the system. Knowledge-
based diagnostics address the timely and accurate fault iso-
lation for maintenance and the unnecessary removal of non-
failed equipment.
The technologies demonstrated in this flight program in-
clude control reconfiguration, fault detection and isolation,
positive pilot alert, and maintenance diagnostics.
Control Mixer Reconfiguration Strategy
The core element of the reconfiguration strategy is the
control mixer. The mixer can accept the outputs of a pre-
existing set of control laws designed for an unimpaired air-
plane and reallocate these output commands for an impaired
airplane to the surviving effectors.
Fault Detection and Isolation
Fault isolation is accomplished by hypothesis testing
through sequential probability ratio tests, a scheme success-
fully used on the NASA F-8 digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) an-
alytic redundancy management experiment.
Positive Pilot Alert
An integral part of the reconfiguration philosophy is the
presentation of surviving flight control system status infor-
mation to the pilot, including a situation assessment of the
existing performance limits of the aircraft failure-damage.
Maintenance Diagnostics
The onboard computer-based fault diagnostic system for
the flight control system reduces the RTOK (retest OK)
and the CND (cannot duplicate) problems. This approach
uses artificial intelligence (AI) to isolate failures occurring
in flight. It uses available built-in test signals and addi-
tional sensor information on maneuver conditions and cock-
pit switch events that are present at the time of failure. Fact
relationships are grouped in rules to find the most likely
failure using an expert system forward-chaining inferenc-
ing process. Details of the inferencing process can be found
in Ref. 6.
Self-Repairing Flight Control System
and Technologies
The SRFCS tested was capable of emulating an impair-
ment and reconfiguration after detection of the impairment.
The SRFCS impairment-failure modes could be selected
by the pilot and flown to assess the performance of the
F-15 aircraft with and without the impairment. Figure 5 is
a block diagram of the F- 15 SRFCS implementation which
includes both the standard mechanical and electronic con-
trol augmentation system (CAS). The F-15 HIDEC CAS
serves to provide stability augmentation and command re-
sponse enhancement through control laws implemented in a
dual-channel DFCC.
The baseline mode is unchanged until an impairment is
introduced. Two SRFCS commands, shown in Fig. 5, were
added to the F-15 HIDEC CAS servo controller commands.
The first command forces the control system to represent
failure conditions. (This software module is for flight test
only.) The second command adds a reconfiguration correc-
tion to each control surface servo controller.
The flight test aircraft is configured with three impair-
ments that are selectable from the pilot's commands. All
impairments affect the right-horizontal stabilator. The im-
pairments are activated with software commands to the sta-
bilator servo actuator to accurately represent the desired fail-
ure (Fig. 5). The commands negate the mechanical system
inputs and pattern the stabilator for the desired impairment.
Once the failure type is selected and activated by the pilot, it
remains active throughout the fault detection sequence and
pilot evaluation of the reconfigured airplane. Both the fail-
ure and the correction commands disappear upon pilot de-
activation ofthe reconfiguration test mode through a switch
on the control stick.
Three types of failure modes were mechanized and
flight-tested.
1. Locked at trim-representing hydraulic or mechanical
failure.
2. Locked at an offset position-representing a failure
caused by a hydraulic or mechanical jam. Values up
to 6°-offset locked position can be flown.
3. Partialsurfaceloss-reprcsentinga portion of theright
stabilatormissing-becauseofmidaircollisionorbattle
damage of50 percent,80 percent,and IO0 percent.
Fault Detection, Ciassifi_tion, and Estimation
The fault detection process involves pairwise hypothesis
testing performed with sequential probability ratio tests to
identify the failed flight control surfaces. Figure 6 sho_s-a
block diagram of the system impairment detection and clas-
siiication (SIDC).
To show the difference in normal aircraft, as opposed to
impaired aircraft response, acceleration residual errors are
used to trigger the fault detection. After further processing,
the acceleration residual errors identify the surface. This in-
formation is then sent to either the mixer, if local failures
are identified, or the effector gain estimator (EGE) subrou-
tine for partial surface loss failures.
The amount of surfac.e _rnage is estimated as a span loss
by the EGE, shown in Fig. 7. The missing span value is es-
timated using a Kalman filter estimator process by compar-
ing aircraft acceleration data with a model of the damaged
aircraft.
Reconfiguration
The fault detection isolation and estimation (FDIE) pro,
rides information on aircraft damage used in the reconfig-
uration mixer shown in Fig. 8. After failure detection and
surface impairment damage estimation, the SRFCS system
utilizes two aircraft models responding in real time to the
same commands controlling the F-15 aircraft. These mod-
els continually output accelerations of both the undamaged
and damaged aircraft.
Correction commands can be found that will cause the
acceleration error to be reduced in the model. These same
commands can also be added to the real aircraft surface com-
mands to restore normal control. The calculation of these
correction commands uses an inverse matrix multiplication
described further in Ref. 6. The matrix is weighted with the
control limits of the remaining conlrol surfaces. This allows
the forces and moments on the aircraft to be as close as pos-
sible to the forces and moments on the unimpaired aircraft.
Cockpit Display and Control
Controls in the cockpit allow the aircraft test pilot to se-
lect the type of impairment and the test mode desired. Ei-
ther separate selection of the FDIE or reconfiguration mixer
subroutines can be made, or the complete sequence of detec-
tion, isolation, and reconfiguration process can be activated.
A reset or decouple command returns the aircraft to normal
flight control operation.
After detection of the fault, a special pilot positive alert
display is added to the HUD, showing the failed surface and
the maneuver limits imposed by the reconfigured system.
As shown in Fig. 9, this display cues the pilot not to ex-
ceed remaining flight control system limitations necessary
for successful reconfigured flight. This is achieved if the pi-
lot maintains a steering symbol inside a maneuver authority
box. The box size is a function of the impairment and the
current flight condition.
Onboard Expert System Maintenance Diagnostics
In addition to the reconfiguration, the SRFCS has an ex-
pert system capability that can detect and isolate system
component failures occurring in routine :_aircraftuse. These
onboard diagn0stdcs fire adept ai firiding iniermitteiit faults
that happen only in flight and relate to casual events such as
maneuver action, cooling temperature, pilot input sequence,
or other fact relationships that may be impossible to recon-
struct in post/tight maintenance troubleshooting.
Flight Test Process
Figure 10 shows the flight envelope used for SRFCS de-
velopment. The system was developed for the design enve-
lope but it was also tested in the pilot maneuver envelope.
The pilot could select various impairmgn_d SRFCS test
modes. Table 1 displays the test conditions flown: (a) im-
pairments of the right stabilator; Co)the maneuver sequence,
and (c) the SRFCS subroutine or test mode that could be se-
lected by the pilot.
Tests were also conducted on the OES diagnostics using
maneuver sequences designed to tng_ the fault scenarios
shown in Fig. 11. The SRFCS flights from December 1989
to March 1990 tested scenario 1 to scenario 5; scenario 6
had been flown successfully in March 1989)
Preliminary Flight Test Results
The summary results of the FDIE are shown in Fig. 12.
These results are preliminary; the test data are being ana-
lyzed for comparison of design response against flight re-
sponse. The FDIE performance was directly related to the
onboard simulation model fdelity.
The flight performance of the reconfiguration mixer was
judged satisfactory by the NASA evaluation pilots, with the
largest effects occurring for the 6°-locked stabilator impair-
ments. This impairment requires large stick offsets just to
maintain level flight while the reconfigured system permits
the pilot to control with normal stick position. Figure 13 is
an example of the stick position change. The indication is
that after recontiguration, no offset is required to maneuver
command of the reconfigured aircraft.
The OES diagnostics performed well, accurately deter-
mining the fault for all scenarios flown.
Conclusion
Flight tests were conducted with the self-repairing flight
control system (SRFCS) installed on the NASA F-15 highly
integrated digital electronic control (HIDEC) aircraft. The
test results demonstrated the successful application of the
SRFCS to a fighter aircraft. The value of flight testing was
also wetl-documented with in-flight evaluation of all tech-
nical areas.
Key highlights of the flight results include:
1.
.
°
4°
The fault detection isolation and estimation (FDIE)
overall performance was good, with no false detection
for the maneuvers flown. The method used is depen-
dent on aircraft model fidelity used in the system.
The reconfiguration technique clearly benefits the pi-
lot for large impairments. The results indicate that
the larger the impairments, the greater the benefit of
a SRFCS.
The reconfiguration sequence of FDIE and subsequent
reconfigured control is accurate for the selected maneu-
vers of the flight test program. The flight test showed
that the accuracy of the detection system is related to
the magnitude of impairment of the degraded control
and the related size of the error signature.
The onboard expert system (OES) accurately identifies
component faults of the kind that are intermittent with
maneuver conditions.
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Table 1. Test conditions.
(a) Right-Stabilator Impairment.
Locked at trim
Locked at +2*
Locked at +4 °
Locked at +6*
80-percent missing span
100-percent missing span
50-percent missing span
Co) Test Maneuvers.
Pitch and roll stick doublets
Pushover and pullup
3-g windup turn
3-9 bank-to-bank roll
(c) Configuration.
No impairment
Impairment
Impairment with fault detection
Impairment with effector estimator
Impairment with recontiguration mixer
Impairment with complete reconfiguration sequence
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Program pilot
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Dual digital
flight computers 900235
Fig. 1 NASA F-I5 test vehicle offers high-capacity software for self-repairing flight demonstration.
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Hawk/32 processor
Program executive control
Maintenance diagnostics
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EGE
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29,600
38,395
10,179
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14,222
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13,675
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Computation
time, msec
3.2
2.6
3.9
8.8
19.3
1.3
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Pitch 3.18
Roll 4.19
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Fig. 3 F-15 aircraft software rcquiremenls.
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The NASA F-15 flight test was the first demonstration of real-time reconfiguration and diagnostics on a high-
performance fighter.
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